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Hobby Lobby, Carnell Construction, and the Theoretical
Deficit of Second-Class Personhood: The Indecipherable
Calculus of Corporate Rights*
“If only there were some way to prove that corporations were not
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INTRODUCTION
In Carnell Construction Corp. v. Danville Redevelopment &
Housing Authority,2 the Fourth Circuit of Appeals took the plunge
into the polluted waters of corporate personhood and racial identity.3
In concluding that the Virginia-based Carnell Construction
Corporation (“Carnell”) had standing to assert a federal race
discrimination claim4 against Danville Redevelopment and Housing
* © 2015 Tyson C. Leonhardt.
1. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Heavy Settle (Comedy Central television broadcast
Dec. 4, 2013), http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/wc91m5/heavy-settle [http://perma.cc/LGY4TWVQ].
2. 745 F.3d 703 (4th Cir. 2014).
3. Id. at 709.
4. Carnell brought its racial discrimination claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2012), which prohibits “discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2012), which prohibits an employer from using a person’s race as the basis for refusing to
enter, interfering with, or terminating an employment contract. See, e.g., Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1976) (“There could hardly be a clearer indication of
congressional agreement with the view that § 1981 does reach private acts of racial
discrimination.” (emphasis added)); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441–42
n.78 (1968) (quoting Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906)) (“Section 1981
provides, in terms that closely parallel those of § 1982, . . . that all persons in the United
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Authority (“Housing Authority”), the Fourth Circuit imputed the
African-American racial identity of Carnell’s corporate owner to the
corporate entity itself.5 Though the issue was one of first impression
in the Fourth Circuit, similar racial-identity challenges brought by
corporate entities in several neighboring circuits provided the Carnell
Construction court a deep pool of pertinent decisions to guide its
analysis.6 Persuaded in particular by the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in a
similar case from 2004,7 the Fourth Circuit concluded “a corporation
that is minority-owned and has been properly certified as such under
applicable law can be the direct object of discriminatory action and
establish standing to bring an action based on such discrimination.”8
This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Carnell Construction and the convergence among the circuits on the
question of “corporate race” represents a trend of enabling corporate
entities to assume an increasing number of personal attributes and
liberties. The discussion below explores this nationwide trend toward
a broader construction of corporate personhood by dissecting the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Carnell Construction in light of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision to extend religious rights to closely
held corporations in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.9 The push
to provide corporate entities with greater protection and recognition
independent from their owners is certain to give rise to a number of
challenging legal questions. This Comment addresses the analytical
States ‘shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.’ ”); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S.
1, 17 (1906) (“[O]ne of the disabilities of slavery, one of the indicia of its existence, was a
lack of power to make or perform contracts . . . .”), overruled in part by Jones, 392 U.S.
409.
5. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 715–16.
6. Seven circuit courts had previously granted corporations standing to assert federal
claims of racial discrimination independent from their owners. See, e.g., Thinket Ink Info.
Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (§ 1981 claim); Oti
Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 882 (8th Cir. 2003) (Fair Housing Act
claims); Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Grp. Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 295 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.
2002) (§§ 1981 and 1982 claims); Gersman v. Grp. Health Ass’n, 931 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (§ 1981 claim), vacated on other grounds, 502 U.S. 1068 (1992); Triad Assocs.,
Inc. v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 591 (7th Cir. 1989) (§ 1983 claim), abrogated on
other grounds, Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); Hudson Valley
Freedom Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach, 671 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1982) (Title VI claim); Des
Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 13–14 (1st Cir. 1979) (§ 1981 claim). But see
Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F. App’x 681, 688 (3d
Cir. 2011) (dismissing Title VI claim brought by charter school).
7. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc., 368 F.3d at 1058–59.
8. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 715.
9. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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tension fueling these questions—questions that increasingly threaten
to undermine the law’s advancement of corporate rights. The
doctrinal incompatibility exposed is puzzling: Courts consistently
endorse poorly translatable, case-by-case personifications of
corporate litigants—the approach taken by the Carnell Construction
and Hobby Lobby courts—instead of adopting more theoretically
cohesive alternatives, such as corporate personality theory, which
both common sense and academic inquiry have shown to be the more
logical approach.
Part I traces the historical evolution of “corporate personhood,”
a concept heavily relied upon and ultimately expanded in both
Carnell Construction and Hobby Lobby. Part II analyzes the two
primary cases animating this commentary. Although the Supreme
Court decided Hobby Lobby after the Fourth Circuit decided Carnell
Construction, this Comment examines Hobby Lobby in an attempt to
shed fresh light on the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions. Both analyses
focus primarily on the courts’ discussions of corporate personhood.
Part II concludes with an analytical bridge between the rules
articulated in Carnell Construction and Hobby Lobby and those
limited principles set out in Part I. Part III presents a critical
discussion that both flows from and moves beyond Part I’s
exploration of corporate personhood. By using the Carnell
Construction and Hobby Lobby courts’ kindred findings that
corporate owners can assign or “impute” their characteristics or
identities to the corporate entities that they helm—size or motive
(theoretically) notwithstanding—as a jumping-off point, Part III
draws on compatible corporate law theories that help reorient the
movement to corporatize traditionally personal rights. Part III uses
these theories to advocate for an alternative to the Supreme Court’s
laissez-faire approach to establishing corporate rights. To that end,
Part III critiques the Supreme Court’s failure to advance a
comprehensive corporate-rights framework, which this Comment
argues is necessary to ensure doctrinal consistency.
I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
The debate over corporate personhood has raged in the
academic literature for many decades.10 That discussion has not only
10. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its
Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1404 (2006) (“For more than a century American courts
have been receptive to the notion that corporate actors are persons or entities with rights
of their own rather than merely creatures of the state or instruments of [natural
persons].”). See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of
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intensified11 in the years since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. FEC,12 it has gone mainstream.13 The Court’s recent
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985) (examining the history of corporate
theory that led the Court to adopt the view that a corporation is a person in Santa Clara);
Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990) (exploring the Court’s history of conferring the Bill of Rights
guarantees to corporations); Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The
Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563 (1987) (presenting different views, major
controversies, and linguistic foundations of corporate personhood).
11. See generally Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional
Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221 (2011) (arguing the drafters and ratifiers of the
Constitution intended a definition of the words “people,” “person,” and “citizen” that did
not include corporations); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald,
and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887 (2011)
(examining the relationship between corporate personhood and the Second Amendment);
James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565 (presenting a
social theory that adequately explains the arguments for the theory of corporate
personhood).
12. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
13. See, e.g., Nancy Benac, Corporations Are People? It’s a Real Legal Concept,
YAHOO! NEWS (July 3, 2014, 10:37 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/corporations-people-reallegal-concept-070458465--finance.html [http://perma.cc/N73V-CRLC] (discussing the
“renewed debate over the idea of corporations as people,” and tracing the concept to “legal
cases stretching back to the 1880s”); Michael P. Falcone & Z. Byron Wolf, Mitt Romney at
Iowa State Fair: “Corporations Are People, My Friend”, ABC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2011/08/romney-shouted-down-at-fair-corporations-arepeople-too-my-friends.html [http://perma.cc/LL3M-LLZ7 (dark archive)] (quoting thenpresidential candidate Mitt Romney’s now-infamous remark during the 2012 campaign:
“Corporations are people, my friend, . . . Of course they are, . . . everything corporations
earn ultimately goes to people. . . . Where do you think it goes? . . . Whose pockets?
People’s pockets, . . . [h]uman beings, my friend.”); Kent Greenfield, Let Us Now Praise
Corporate Persons, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan./Feb. 2015), http://www.washingtonmonthly
.com/magazine/januaryfebruary_2015/features/let_us_now_praise_corporate_pe053466
.php# [http://perma.cc/86F9-M7G9] (“[T]he attack on corporate personhood is a mistake.
And it may, ironically, be playing into the hands of the financial and managerial elite.
What’s the best way to control corporate power? More corporate personhood, not less.”);
Charles McGrath, Colbert Pushes “Corporations Are People” Referendum, N.Y. TIMES: THE
CAUCUS (Dec. 6, 2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/06
/colberts-pushes-corporations-are-people-referendum/?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/3D7L-GUCG]
(discussing the efforts of then-Comedy Central host Stephen Colbert to include a
referendum question on corporate personhood during the 2012 South Carolina
Republican primary); Eric Posner, Stop Fussing over Personhood, SLATE (Dec. 11, 2013,
10:09
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from
_chicago/2013/12/personhood_for_corporations_and_chimpanzees_is_an_essential_legal_fict
ion.html [http://perma.cc/A6C4-B94Z] (“There has been much mockery of the idea that
‘corporations are people, my friend,’ as Mitt Romney put it. But if you think it matters
whether the law calls a chimpanzee, corporation, or even human zygote a ‘person,’ you are
making a fundamental error about how the law works.”); Nina Totenberg, When Did
Companies Become People? Excavating the Legal Evolution, NPR (July 28, 2014, 4:57 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/when-did-companies-become-people-excavatingthe-legal-evolution [http://perma.cc/J6NG-ABX6 (dark archive)] (noting that “in the past
four years, the high court has dramatically expanded corporate rights”); Jack & Suzy
Welch, Opinion, It’s True: Corporations Are People, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2012, 6:37

94 N.C. L. REV. 648 (2016)

652

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

ruling in Hobby Lobby14 has only added fuel to the fire.15 The
continued currency of the corporate personhood debate, however,
belies its ancient roots.16 Indeed, as Justice Story noted in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward17 nearly 200 years ago,
[a]n aggregate corporation at common law is a collection of
individuals united into one collective body, under a special
name, and possessing certain immunities, privileges, and
capacities in its collective character, which do not belong to the
natural persons composing it. . . . It is, in short, an artificial
person, existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with
certain powers and franchises which, though they must be
exercised through the medium of its natural members, are yet
considered as subsisting in the corporation itself, as distinctly as
if it were a real personage.18
Justice Story’s definition notwithstanding, Chief Justice John
Marshall’s majority opinion offered a different perspective: “A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it . . . .”19 Two decades after Chief Justice Marshall and
Justice Story addressed the question of corporate personhood, Chief

PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303740704577524823306803692
[http://perma.cc/TGH7-H69B (dark archive)] (“Of course corporations are people. What
else would they be? Buildings don’t hire people. Buildings don’t design cars that run on
electricity or discover DNA-based drug therapies that target cancer cells in ways our
parents could never imagine.”).
14. 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
15. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 95, 95 (2014) (arguing that the Court did not actually adopt the theory that
corporations are “real entities” in Hobby Lobby); Malcom J. Harkins III, The Uneasy
Relationship of Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, the Affordable Care Act, and the
Corporate Person: How a Historical Myth Continues To Bedevil the Legal System, 7 ST.
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 201 (2014) (urging the Supreme Court of the United
States to take a clear position on corporate personhood); Alan J. Meese & Nathan B.
Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit
Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 273 (2014) (arguing that
religious for-profit organizations do not compromise the objectives of corporate law).
16. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 687 (1978) (“[B]y 1871, it
was well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all
purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis.”); Soc’y for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 482 (1823)
(“[T]here is no difference between a corporation and a natural person, in respect to their
capacity to hold real property, . . . the civil rights of both are the same.”).
17. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
18. Id. at 667–68 (Story, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 636 (majority opinion).
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Justice Roger B. Taney reopened the debate over corporate
personhood by offering this definition:
[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the
boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists
only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law. . . . It is
indeed a mere artificial being, invisible and intangible; yet it is a
person, for certain purposes in contemplation of law, and has
been recognized as such by the decisions of this Court.20
Chief Justice Taney’s hedging effectively illustrates the Court’s
notorious reputation of sending mixed signals in the area of corporate
law, especially where those questions touch or concern matters of
constitutional law.21
Ample Supreme Court precedent supports the notion that
corporations should, at least under certain circumstances, be
understood as “persons” in the constitutional sense.22 Further, where
federal statutes are at play, Congress clarified the issue in its
enactment of the Dictionary Act,23 which provides that, “the words
‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as

20. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Clements, Beyond Citizens United v. FEC: Re-Examining
Corporate Rights, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, Nov. 2009 at 9 (noting that “the
Court has hardly been consistent in its reaction to corporate demands upon the Court’s
extraordinary power to invalidate democratic enactments,” and describing “the
substantive due process era that followed the Court’s declaration at the turn of the 20th
century that corporations are ‘persons’ under the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of
the life, liberty, and property of persons,” as the one of the “most notorious examples of
the Court’s responsiveness”).
22. Meese & Oman, supra note 15, at 275 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 264 (1964); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–35
(1897); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189
(1888); Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 553
(1844)). Meese and Oman’s illuminating defense of corporate rights argues that corporate
personhood has been long entrenched in American constitutional law. Id. For a conflicting
view of the historical development of corporate personhood, see Naomi Lamoreaux &
William Novak, Getting the History Right: Tracking the Real History of Corporate Rights in
American Constitutional Thought, SLATE (Mar. 24, 2014, 4:48 PM), http://www.slate.com
/articles/news_and_politics
/jurisprudence/2014/03/hobby_lobby_and_corporate_personhood_here_s_the_real_history_
of_corporate.html [http://perma.cc/E9XE-TQAR] (“Contrary to present efforts to depict
corporations as simple and natural entities—like persons—entitled to constitutional rights,
a different view prevailed for most of American history. Until the mid-20th century, the
corporation was seen as a special and artificial creature of the government. It has never
been seen as entitled to the same array of rights guaranteed to citizens.”).
23. 1 U.S.C. §§ 1–8 (2012).
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individuals . . . .”24 As discussed below, the Supreme Court has at
times relied on this statutory language, and the congressional
acquiescence to corporate personhood that it implies, in deciding
non-constitutional questions of corporate rights.25 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the Dictionary Act’s inclusive
definition of personhood with approbation in its discussion of
corporate status and racial identity in Carnell Construction.26
Nevertheless, there is also substantial support, in both history27
and precedent,28 to buoy the reasoning behind those who oppose the
expansion of corporate personhood.29 Justice Brandeis’s lengthy
dissent to the Court’s decision in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee,30 for

24. Id. § 1; see also Emily J. Barnet, Hobby Lobby and the Dictionary Act, 124 Y ALE
L.J. F. 11, 12 (2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/hobby-lobby-and-the-dictionary-act
[http://perma.cc/7EF8-G5D8] (noting that “in line with general trends in statutory
interpretation, courts have applied the Act inconsistently for the past century” (footnote
omitted)); Meese & Oman, supra note 15, at 276 (pointing out that the Dictionary Act
defines “ ‘persons’ without regard to whether such firms or individuals are engaged in
profit-seeking activities”).
25. See infra Section II.A.
26. Carnell Constr. Co. v. Danville Redev. & Hous. Auth., 745 F.3d 703, 714 n.4 (4th
Cir. 2014); see also infra Section II.B.
27. See, e.g., Lamoreaux & Novak, supra note 22 (“Most of America’s first
corporations . . . were viewed as essentially public service corporations or public franchises.
In addition to grants of property and public financing, the state usually accorded such
entities special privileges like monopoly power, the power of eminent domain, or tolltaking authority. In return for those benefits, the government insisted on the special public
obligations of corporations. Not only were corporations not exempted in any way from
generally applicable regulatory laws, but they were routinely held to higher standards of
public service, public accountability, social responsibility, and public trust. Even after the
proliferation of general incorporation laws, and even after most state constitutions
prohibited legislatures from granting privileges to particular corporations, states continued
to treat corporations as artificial entities with special obligations to the states that created
them.”).
28. See, e.g., Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 108–09 (1911) (upholding the
corporate income tax on the grounds that it was properly an excise tax on the privilege of
doing business as a corporation); Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)
(holding that the liberty of due process was crafted as “the liberty of natural, not artificial
persons”); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 43 (1906) (refusing to extend Fifth Amendment
protections against self-incrimination to corporations by holding the government’s need to
monitor the artificial entities it created to be superior).
29. See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–49 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting in part); see also supra note 15.
30. 288 U.S. 517 (1933). In Louis K. Liggett Co., the Court was tasked with deciding
the constitutionality of a Florida statute that discriminately targeted chain stores. Id. at
517. The Florida law required all businesses with stores located in multiple counties within
the state to pay higher taxes than those imposed on single-locale businesses that were
independently owned. Id. The Court held that the discriminatory tax increase was
unreasonable and thus struck down the anti–chain store law as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
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example, sheds a less sympathetic light on the evolution of the
corporate entity that contrasts with its place in modern-day life:
The prevalence of the corporation in America has led men of
this generation to act, at times, as if the privilege of doing
business in corporate form were inherent in the citizen; and has
led them to accept the evils attendant upon the free and
unrestricted use of the corporate mechanism as if these evils
were the inescapable price of civilized life and, hence, to be
borne with resignation. Throughout the greater part of our
history a different view prevailed. . . . [Indeed,] incorporation
for business was commonly denied long after it had been freely
granted for religious, educational and charitable purposes.31
Justice Brandeis’s nearly century-old opinion remains relevant
today. Indeed, a pair of anti-corporate rights crusaders channeled
Brandeis’s historical perspective in the lead up to last summer’s
Hobby Lobby decision when they wrote, “[C]orporations are subject
to more oversight than are individual citizens. . . . And for most of
American history, nothing in a corporation’s legal status was
construed to protect it from generally operable police power statutes
passed by the legislature in the interest of the public’s health, safety,
comfort, and welfare.”32 Yet, while such historical appeals may lend
considerable force to those seeking to preclude corporations from
attaining additional rights and liberties, they offer little explanation as
to why present-day corporations should be bound by the same
antiquated views that governed their corporate predecessors.33
As the wildly divergent characterizations above demonstrate, the
difference in opinion over the role and rights of the corporate entity is
nearly as old as the nation itself. Such polarization will not likely be
resolved soon. If anything, the fervor surrounding the Court’s
decision in Hobby Lobby suggests that the debate is growing more

31. Id. at 548–49.
32. Lamoreaux & Novak, supra note 22.
33. Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. et al. at 5, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 281683 at *5 (“Before
the 1830s, profit-making corporate enterprises were often government-created franchises
enjoying chartered privileges to exercise a sovereign prerogative (such as constructing
roads or canals) or monopoly status. But beginning in the early nineteenth century, private
companies began using the corporate form to conduct purely private
business. . . . [C]orporations were no longer creatures of the state.” (internal citations
omitted)); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 137 (3d ed. 2005)
(explaining that “[o]ld decisions and doctrines, from the time when most corporations
were academies, churches, charities, and cities” are largely inapposite to the modern-day
“world of business corporations”).
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robust.34 With increasing uncertainty over corporate rights and
personhood, the Supreme Court must offer lower courts a clearer and
more comprehensive scheme of corporate personhood rights.
Unfortunately, the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby to provide
certain corporate entities with federally codified religious exercise
rights offered no cohesive theory of corporate personhood. And,
“although the Court is pragmatically averse to theories of corporate
personhood, . . . [t]he Court’s avoidance of corporate personality does
not make the issue disappear; it simply becomes a judicial silence,
pregnant with implication.”35 Indeed, the Hobby Lobby decision,
coupled with subtler corporate personhood victories in the circuit
courts,36 including the Fourth Circuit’s illustrative decision to allow
corporations to assume an imputed racial identity, demonstrates that
the courts have no problem expanding the corporate arsenal of rights
despite their inability to articulate the scope or meaning of corporate
personhood and the attendant consequences.37
II. CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE PERSONHOOD CASE LAW
Although decided after Carnell Construction, this Comment
surveys the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby first. Both the
majority and minority opinions issued by the Hobby Lobby Court
shed fresh light on the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions and frame the
ensuing discussion of corporate personhood.

34. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text.
35. Miller, supra note 11, at 915.
36. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148 (2d Cir. 2010),
aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 308 (4th Cir. 2008); cf. Susanna Kim
Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens United: An Analysis of the
Popular Movement To End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 209, 221 n.42 (“[T]he Court’s decision [in Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad.
Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886)] relied on the aggregate theory arguments . . . [advanced by]
Justice Field in his circuit court opinion in the companion case, San Mateo v. So. Pac. R.R.
Co. (The Railroad Tax Cases), 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).”). But see, James D. Nelson,
The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 467 (2015) (discussing the
incoherency in federal case law concerning businesses’ freedom-of-association rights
under the First Amendment and arguing that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court has only
obliquely addressed associational asymmetry, lower courts have consistently applied it as a
matter of First Amendment doctrine”).
37. See infra Part III.
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A. Hobby Lobby
The Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.38 addressed a circuit split concerning the friction between
the religious beliefs of closely held corporations and the Affordable
Care Act’s (“ACA”)39 so-called “contraceptive mandate” provision.40
That provision requires certain employer-sponsored health plans to
give women free “preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for
in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and
Services Administration,” a regulatory arm of the Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”).41
In an effort to resolve the inconsistency among the circuit courts,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear two cases—Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. v. Sebelius,42 a Tenth Circuit case decided in favor of Christian
owners of two closely held businesses,43 and Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services,44 a Third Circuit case decided in favor of HHS.45 In
both cases, the owners of the closely held, for-profit corporations
contended that compliance with the ACA’s contraceptive mandate
would require them to violate their “sincere religious belief that life
begins at conception.”46 The corporate plaintiffs in each case sued
federal officials and agencies under the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act (“RFRA”)47 and the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment,48 in an attempt “to enjoin application of the
ACA’s contraceptive mandate.”49
In Conestoga Wood, the Hahns, Mennonite owners of Conestoga
Wood Specialties, appealed a district court decision denying their
request for a preliminary injunction to the ACA’s contraceptive
mandate.50 The Third Circuit found the mandate imposed no
requirements on the Hahns personally and concluded that “for-profit,
secular corporations cannot engage in religious exercise” under
38. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
39. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
40. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
42. 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).
43. Id. at 1120–21.
44. 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).
45. Id. at 381.
46. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2751, 2775 (2014).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
49. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
50. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 381.
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RFRA or the First Amendment, affirming the district court’s
decision.51 The Hahns appealed the decision to the Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari.52
In Hobby Lobby, the Greens, Christian owners of Hobby Lobby,
a chain of arts and crafts stores, were also denied a preliminary
injunction to the ACA’s contraception provision.53 Unlike the Third
Circuit in Conestoga Wood, however, the Tenth Circuit found “no
persuasive reason to think that Congress meant ‘person’ in RFRA to
mean anything other than its default meaning in the Dictionary Act—
which includes corporations regardless of their profit-making
status.”54 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the district
court’s denial of the Greens’ preliminary injunction motion,55 and
remanded the case with explicit instructions that the lower court
address the remaining preliminary injunction factors.56 HHS appealed
the decision to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.57
In July 2013, several months before the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, HHS issued
regulations specifying the ACA requirements for women’s
“preventive health services,” and adopted as binding the Health
Resources
and
Services
Administration’s
“preventive
care . . . guidelines.”58 These comprehensive guidelines included a
requirement compelling nonexempt employer-sponsored plans to
provide female employees with coverage of “FDA-approved
contraceptive methods, including Plan B, Ella, and IUDs.”59
However, the HHS rules adopted in 2013 exempted “group
health plan[s] established or maintained by a religious employer”
from “any requirement to cover contraceptive services.”60 “Religious
employer” was defined as “an organization that is organized and
operates as a nonprofit entity and is referred to in section
51. Id.
52. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13356).
53. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284–85, 1296–97
(W.D. Okla. 2012).
54. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1132 (10th Cir. 2013).
55. Id. at 1147.
56. Id.
57. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-354).
58. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2013).
59. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,888 (July 2, 2013), commentary on 45 CFR § 147.130 (2012).
60. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013).
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6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code.”61 The
relevant portions of the Internal Revenue Code mention only
“churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or
associations of churches,” and “the exclusively religious activities of
any religious order.”62 In short, only churches and other houses of
worship were exempted from the ACA mandate to provide
employees with cost-free contraceptive services. Thus, neither of the
for-profit corporations involved in the consolidated Hobby Lobby
decision qualified for the religious employer exemption to the
contraceptive mandate.
Apart from religious employers’ wholesale exemption from the
contraceptive mandate, the 2013 regulations also accommodated
qualifying nonprofit institutions.63 The accommodation enabled
nonprofit religious organizations opposed to providing coverage for
“some or all of [the ACA-mandated] contraceptive services” to assign
the costs of those services to a third party, most likely an insurance
carrier, following a “self-certification” procedure.64
In response to the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, HHS
proposed revisions to its regulations detailing organizations that
would be exempt from providing the contraceptive services mandated
by the ACA.65 In line with the Court’s holding, the proposed
amendments extended the existing religious-based accommodation to
include closely held for-profit businesses that object “to covering
some or all of the contraceptive services on account of [their] owners’
sincerely held religious beliefs.”66 The proposed rules suggest “two
possible approaches to defining a qualifying closely held for-profit
entity . . . [and] invite comments on other approaches as well.”67 One
approach would require qualifying businesses to be privately owned
and would impose a cap on the number of shareholders or owners.68
An alternative approach would necessitate, in addition to the private
“ownership requirement, that a specified fraction of the ownership
interest [be] concentrated in a limited and specified number of
owners.”69
61. Id.
62. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (2012).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)–(c) (2013).
64. Id. § 147.131(b)–(c)(1).
65. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 51,118, 51,126–27 (proposed Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
66. Id. at 51,126.
67. Id. at 51,124.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 51,121–22.
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Lastly, in addition to proposing the new rules outlined above,
HHS issued new regulations that set out an alternative certification
procedure for qualifying organizations with religious objections to
filing a self-certification form with their insurers.70 The alternative
process “provides that an eligible organization may notify HHS in
writing of its religious objection to coverage of all or a subset of
contraceptive services.”71 From there, the government assumes
responsibility for notifying the insurance carrier that it must arrange
for contraceptive coverage in lieu of the religious organization.72
The Court held that both Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga
Wood Specialties, as closely held businesses, were entitled to the
religious protections guaranteed under RFRA, which “prohibits the
‘Government [from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability’
unless the Government ‘demonstrates that application of the burden
to the person’ ” advances a compelling government interest by the
least restrictive means.73 Although, as Justice Alito explained,
“Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and Greens
by employing a familiar legal fiction: It included corporations within
RFRA’s definition of ‘persons.’ ”74 Moreover, the Court stressed the
importance of keeping in mind Congress’s aim of protecting people’s
religious rights:
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human
beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law
specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with
70. Id. at 51,101. The alternative process closely tracks an interim order issued by the
Court staying an injunction in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) (order
granting injunction). The Wheaton order, joined by six of the nine Justices and issued in
the week following the Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby, reasoned that Wheaton College
could opt out of the contraceptive services at odds with its sincere religious beliefs by
simply informing the government. Id. at 2807. This alternative opt-out process relieved
Wheaton College administrators from personally signing and sending the opt-out form to
the insurer, a process the college argued made it complicit in offering the contraceptive
coverage Id. at 2807–08.
71. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 51,094.
72. See id. at 51,095.
73. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (emphasis
added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b)). With the enactment of the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012)), RFRA’s reach was expanded to cover “any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.” Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
74. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
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a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the
purpose is to protect the rights of these people. For example,
extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations
protects the privacy interests of employees and others
associated with the company. Protecting corporations from
government seizure of their property without just compensation
protects all those who have a stake in the corporations’
financial well-being. And protecting the free-exercise rights of
corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel
protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and
control those companies.75
Having determined that the closely held companies76 were
entitled to religious protection under RFRA,77 the Court concluded
that the HHS regulations at issue amounted to a substantial burden
on the companies’ exercise of religion because they required the
provision of “health-insurance coverage for methods of contraception
that violate the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies’
owners.”78
In writing his majority opinion, Justice Alito made a number of
plainspoken attempts79 to limit the Hobby Lobby decision to the facts
75. Id. In reaching the opposite conclusion the year before, the Third Circuit had
reasoned that “[g]eneral business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions
or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They do not
pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate
and apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors.” Id. (quoting
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)). The Court in Hobby Lobby
dismissed the Third Circuit’s logic as “true—but quite beside the point. Corporations,
‘separate and apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them,
cannot do anything at all.” Id.
76. As Justice Alito points out in the majority opinion, the Court had previously
“entertained RFRA and free-exercise claims brought by nonprofit corporations.” Id. at
2768–69 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694 (2012) (Free Exercise); Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficiente União do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Free Exercise)).
77. See id. at 2785. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the companies’
constitutional free exercise claims.
78. Id. at 2759.
79. For instance, Justice Alito responded to the government’s argument that
extending RFRA protection to large, publicly traded corporations would trigger
destructive proxy battles over corporate religious identity by stating, “[W]e have no
occasion in these cases to consider RFRA’s applicability to such companies. The
companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each owned and controlled
by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious
beliefs.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
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of the case, or at the least to the category of so-called “closely held”
businesses.80 The logic underpinning the Court’s decision, however,
has largely frustrated this attempt at judicial restraint. The Court does
not expressly limit its understanding of corporate eligibility for
religious exemptions under RFRA to only those businesses controlled
by a single family, nor does it offer any explicit advice on how to
decide whether a certain business fits the “closely held” label.
Although Justice Alito noted that “[t]hese cases . . . do not involve
publicly traded corporations”81 and argued that “it seems unlikely
that the sort of corporate giants to which HHS refers will often assert
RFRA claims [because of] numerous practical restraints,”82 the logic
underlying the Court’s decision to extend RFRA protection to forprofit companies83 suggests that any business entity of any size or
form could invoke RFRA.84 In spite of this ambiguity, the Court
pointed out that publicly owned companies, with shareholders that
80. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774. Determining what is and what is not a “closely
held” business is complicated by the lack of a universally accepted definition. According to
the Pew Research Center, “[t]he IRS has the clearest definition: For corporate tax purposes,
a closely held corporation is one where more than half of the stock is owned (directly or
indirectly) by five or fewer individuals at any time in the second half of the year.” Drew
DeSilver, What Is a ‘Closely Held Corporation,’ Anyway, and How Many Are There?, PEW
RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (July 7, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/07/what-is
-a-closely-held-corporation-anyway-and-how-many-are-there/ [http://perma.cc/QU7Z-UGVF];
see also, e.g., Stephanie Armour & Rachel Feintzeig, Hobby Lobby Ruling Raises
Question: What Does ‘Closely Held’ Mean?, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2014, 2:56 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/hobby-lobby-ruling-begs-question-what-does-closely-heldmean-1404154577?cb=logged0.016798734897747636 [http://perma.cc/Z6ZZ-NEDT (dark
archive)] (“Closely held companies are owned by a relatively small number of investors,
typically including their founding families and management. Roughly 90% of all
companies in the [United States] are closely held, according to a 2000 study by the
Copenhagen Business School.”).
81. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2768. The Court concluded that, because “RFRA itself does not define the
term ‘person,’ we must therefore look to the Dictionary Act, which we must consult ‘[i]n
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise.’ ”
Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)) (alterations in original). The Dictionary Act defines “the
words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ [to] include corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals . . . .” Id.
84. See id. at 2769 (“No known understanding of the term ‘person’ includes some but
not all corporations. . . . [N]o conceivable definition of the term includes natural persons
and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations.”); see also id. at 2769 n.20
(“Not only does the Government concede that the term ‘persons’ in RFRA includes
nonprofit corporations, it goes further and appears to concede that the term might also
encompass other artificial entities, namely, general partnerships and unincorporated
associations. (citing Brief for Respondents at 28, 40, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(No. 13-354), 2014 WL 546899, at *17)). Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, harshly criticized
the majority for its failure to address the potential problems that could arise from such a
widely defined parameter. See id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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are often both numerous and religiously diverse, will have a much
harder time proving or successfully operating in accordance with a
singular religious view.85 Justice Alito unceremoniously dismissed
concerns that the decision would invite larger for-profit corporations
to litigate under RFRA.86
Seizing on the lack of precision in the majority’s opinion, Justice
Ginsburg attacked the Court for expanding RFRA’s umbrella of
protection to corporate entities wholly incapable of practicing
religion.87 Justice Ginsburg derided “[t]he Court [for] not even
begin[ing] to explain how one might go about ascertaining the
religious scruples of a corporation where shares are sold to the
public.”88 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg, in concluding that
“ ‘[c]losely held’ is not synonymous with ‘small,’ ” pointed out that
“Hobby Lobby’s case demonstrates [that RFRA] claims are indeed
pursued by large corporations, employing thousands of persons of
different faiths, whose ownership is not diffuse.”89
Many have echoed Justice Ginsburg’s criticisms in the months
since the Hobby Lobby ruling. Indeed, almost as soon as the opinions
were released, legal scholars began questioning the tenability of
Justice Alito’s attempt to limit the breadth of the decision, with
several suggesting that an eventual extension of RFRA personhood
to the wider range of business entities is inevitable.90 Not everyone,
however, finds the Court’s constraints impossibly unwieldy. Stephen
Bainbridge, for example, has pointed to the Court’s endorsement of
state corporate law as the appropriate way to resolve intra-corporate

85. See id. at 2774 (majority opinion).
86. Id. (“HHS has not pointed to any example of a publicly traded corporation
asserting RFRA rights.”).
87. See id. at 2797 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id. Justice Ginsburg further noted that “family-owned candy giant Mars, Inc.,
takes in $33 billion in revenues and has some 72,000 employees, and closely held Cargill,
Inc., takes in more than $136 billion in revenues and employs some 140,000 persons.” Id.
(citing Andrea Murphy & Scott DeCarlo, America’s Largest Private Companies 2013,
FORBES (Dec. 18, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20141027052442/http://www.forbes
.com/largest-private-companies [http://perma.cc/E7HT-ZBJ6]).
90. See, e.g., Anne Tucker, The Meaning of Hobby Lobby: Bedrooms, Boardrooms &
Burdens, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 16, 2014), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07
/the-meaning-of-hobby-lobby-bedrooms-boardrooms-burdens.html [http://perma.cc/CK7JHCL7]. Tucker has pointed out that “[e]ven if we accept that the [extension of RFRA
protection] is limited to closely held entities, where should we look for that definition?
State law? IRS guidelines? Common law?” Id. Tucker, in arguing that, “while we have a
general sense [of] what closely held means, the precise boundaries are more difficult,”
envisions one scenario in which “closely held entities become the new pornography where
we only know it when we see it.” Id.
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religious disputes as illustrative of the Court’s intention that lower
courts also look to the law of the state (the state of incorporation,
Bainbridge suggests) in deciding whether a business is closely held.91
Still others argue that the Court’s decision, even if construed as
applying only to closely held corporations, has the potential to
mushroom broadly.92 University of Idaho College of Law’s Sarah
Haan, for example, has argued that “Justice Alito [h]as open[ed] the
door to RFRA free exercise claims by a wide range of companies, the
vast majority of which will bear no likeness to mom-and-pop
businesses.”93
Although the parade-of-horribles advanced in Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent and echoed in the cascade of academic literature that followed
in its wake94 have yet to materialize, the concern that larger for-profit
companies will invoke the decision in an effort to save money is a
valid one. In addition, the Court’s failure to expressly define, or even
offer guidelines for, what constitutes a “closely held” corporation for
purposes of RFRA protection may likely require future clarification.
Despite the theoretical possibility of large, publicly traded behemoths
basing religious exercise claims on the Court’s reasoning in Hobby
Lobby, it seems unlikely that such claims would be successful with
regard to other aspects of the ACA. The Court limited its decision in
Hobby Lobby because a government framework already existed for
insurance companies to provide contraception to employees of notfor-profit religious institutions. The possibility of large corporate
91. See Stephen Bainbridge, What Is a “Close Corporation” for Purposes of the New
Hobby Lobby Rule, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 1, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www
.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/07/what-is-a-close-corporation-forpurposes-of-the-new-hobby-lobby-rule.html [http://perma.cc/YU3B-ZPV5]. However, state
law greatly differs on what qualifies companies as “closely held.” See Sarah Haan, Guest
Post: Closely Held Means “Controlling Shareholder”?, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK:
BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (July 1, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business
_law/2014/07/guest-post-closely-held-means-controlling-shareholder.html
[http://perma.cc
/T9Q3-8VP5] (noting differences in the legal definitions of “closely held” in the states of
Delaware and Maryland). Such state-law variance, Bainbridge and others argue, when
viewed in light of “the important federal interests at stake in the ACA and RFRA statutes,”
may eventually compel the Court, in future litigation, to create “a uniform federal common
law rule.” Bainbridge, supra. Until then, perhaps state law will serve to dispel definitional
confusion.
92. Haan, supra note 91. Professor Haan believes that if courts are to look to state as
opposed to federal law definitions of “closely held,” then “the sincerely-held religious
beliefs of a closely held corporation may just be the sincerely-held religious beliefs of its
controlling shareholder,” since “[t]he most basic principles of state corporate law allow a
controlling shareholder to, well, control the corporation.” Id.
93. Id.
94. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Tucker, supra
note 90.
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entities launching RFRA-based attacks on other current or future
federal statutory schemes seems equally unlikely, given the collectiveaction hurdles that would stymie shareholder efforts to prove the
corporation possesses the “unity of religious purpose” required to
prove that a religious objection is sincere under RFRA.95
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts refused to rule out the
possibility of RFRA personhood applying in “other situations,”
suggesting instead that “[it] is a question that we’ll have to await
another case [to decide, although I don’t think] a large publiclytraded corporation [is going to] come[] in and say[], we have religious
principles.”96 Justice Scalia, too, seemed to entertain the notion that
RFRA could apply to larger corporations by suggesting that
shareholder disputes over whose religion trumps whose would not
require the Court to step in as referee, because, as a matter of state
corporate law, such disputes would be determined by “[w]hoever
controls the corporation.”97 Chief Justice Roberts then brought up a
related corporate rights question in which the government had,
conversely, argued for the extension of a traditionally personal right
to the corporate entity:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Could I just raise [one
question]—eight courts of appeals, [meaning] every
court of appeal to have looked at the situation[,] have
held that corporations can bring racial discrimination
claims as corporations. Now, does the government
have a position on whether corporations have a race?
GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes. We think those [decisions]
are correct and that this situation is different.
....
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . those . . . eight cases
involve construction of the term “person?”
GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes, but only “person.”

95. See David Masci, The Hobby Lobby Impact: A Q&A, PEW RES. CTR., FACT TANK
(July 2, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/02/the-hobby-lobby-impact-aqa/ [http://perma.cc/L5XZ-SC2B].
96. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354 &
13-356), 2014 WL 1351985, at *52.
97. See id. at 52–53.
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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So . . . the corporation can
bring[,] as a person[,] a claim of racial discrimination[?]
GENERAL VERRILLI: That’s correct, but [it can]not
exercise [] religion. That’s the difference. . . .
JUSTICE ALITO: If you say they can’t even get their
day in court, you’re saying something pretty, pretty
strong.98
The dissonance of the government’s positions is telling; it
illustrates the uncertainty that has rendered unpredictable cases that
touch the logical netherworld in which corporate rights exist. And,
until the Court provides a workable framework for differentiating
between corporate and natural personhood and their attendant rights,
corporate litigants will continue to grope blindly in the dark. As one
prominent constitutional law commentator has noted, it is nearly
impossible to distinguish between “purely personal” and “somewhat
personal” rights without the Court declaration of a bright-line test for
“what constitutes an individual non-corporate right.”99 It is long past
time for the Court to abandon its “pragmatic, anti-theoretical
approach to corporate right[]”100 creation, as such an “ad hoc,
arbitrary”101 process eschews conceptual rigor, undermines
consistency, and ultimately weakens the rule of law.
B.

Carnell Construction

On March 4, 2014, less than three weeks before the Supreme
Court heard oral arguments in Hobby Lobby, the Fourth Circuit
announced its corporate-friendly decision in Carnell Construction
Corp. v. Danville Redevelopment & Housing Authority.102 The Fourth
Circuit’s conclusion—that corporations can acquire a racial identity—
largely echoed the legal arguments invoked by the seven sister circuits
that had previously decided the issue; yet, the Carnell Construction
court’s decision took on added significance, given the legally-charged
corporate law environment in which it was decided. As illustrated in
98. Id. at 53–55.
99. Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a
Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions,
63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 798 n.19 (1996).
100. Mayer, supra note 10, at 621 (exploring the Court’s history of conferring Bill of
Rights guarantees on corporations).
101. Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a
Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005).
102. 745 F.3d 703, 710 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 361 (2014).
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Section II.A, the Carnell Construction decision caught the Supreme
Court’s attention in evaluating the corporate claims at stake in Hobby
Lobby. Indeed, the conceptual parallels of Carnell Construction and
Hobby Lobby left the government hard-pressed to defend its dual
positions, which appeared divergent and contradictory to the
Supreme Court. This apparent inconsistency provided the Chief
Justice with a ready-made trap to capture the government, which
could not readily free itself without hobbling its own argument. This
Section digs deeper into the factual context surrounding the Carnell
Construction litigation, explores the contractual feud that lies at its
core, and ultimately questions both the soundness of the Fourth
Circuit’s reasoning and the extent to which its decision comports with
the overarching federal framework of corporate personhood.
The case arose out of a contractual dispute between Carnell and
the Housing Authority.103 The Housing Authority awarded Carnell a
contract to prepare the site of a newly planned public housing project
in Danville, Virginia.104 Although the Housing Authority managed
the project, it was partially funded by a grant from the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).105 After
several months of work, the relationship between Carnell and the
Housing Authority soured, leading Carnell’s president, Michael
Scales, to express concerns that the company, which was certified by
the State of Virginia as a “minority owned business,”106 was being
targeted on the basis of its minority-owned status.107

103. See id. at 710–11.
104. Id. at 710. (“The contract specified a June 2009 completion date, stipulated a total
price of $793,541, and included a set of enumerated contract documents.”). Officially titled
the Blaine Square Project, the public housing initiative sought “to provide subsidized
rental units to low-income residents of Danville.” Id.
105. See id. The federal grant, which totaled $20 million, was provided through HUD’s
Hope VI Program, which “allows private investors to contribute capital to public housing
projects in exchange for tax credits.” Id.
106. In the Commonwealth of Virginia, companies majority owned by African-,
Asian-, Hispanic-, or Native-Americans can apply for minority-owned certification
through the state’s “Small, Women- and Minority-Owned Business” (“SWaM”) program.
See VA. DEP’T. SMALL BUS. AND SUPPLIER DIVERSITY, SWaM Certification Procedures,
VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.dmbe.virginia.gov/swamcert.html [http://perma.cc/3QJM-RCPX].
The program, administered by Virginia’s Department of Small Business and Supplier
Diversity (“SBSD”) agency, aims “to enhance procurement opportunities for SWaM
businesses participating in state-funded projects.” Id. Similar minority-owned-enterprise
(“MBE”) contracting-set-aside programs have been statutorily enacted by most states and
the federal government. See George R. La Noue, Defining Social and Economic
Disadvantage: Are Government Preferential Business Certification Programs Narrowly
Tailored?, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 274, 277 (2012).
107. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 711.
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Scales’s concerns included “allegations that Carnell was ‘being
singled out as a minority contractor,’ and was ‘expected . . . to work
for free’ on ‘excessive’ project modifications.”108 Though Gary
Wasson, the Housing Authority’s Executive Director, submitted to
Carnell’s request for mediation, the parties’ attempt to resolve the
feud out of court floundered.109 In May 2009, the Housing Authority
advised Carnell that it would not offer Carnell the option to renew its
contract, which was set to expire the following month.110 Carnell was
also told to “remove its equipment and personnel from the project
site the following month regardless [of] whether the work had been
completed.”111 Carnell complied with the Housing Authority’s
demand and requested reimbursement for alleged instances of unpaid
work.112 These requests were denied.113
Instead, the Housing Authority declared a default under
Carnell’s performance bond, which in turn prompted Carnell to sue
the Housing Authority in federal court, alleging racial
discrimination.114 Carnell brought its racial discrimination claims
under both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964115 and § 1981,116
which prohibit employers from using a person’s race as the basis for
refusing to enter, interfering with, or terminating an employment
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. The racial discrimination claims centered on “certain statements made by
the Housing Authority’s Hope VI Program Director and Contracting Officer, Cedric
Ulbing, as well as alleged disparate treatment with respect to contracting practices such as
‘prepayment’ for materials, ‘retainage’ of progress payments, and approval of change
order requests.” Id.
115. 42 U.S.C §§ 2000d-1 to -7 (2012). The law provides that “[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” § 2000d.
116. § 1981. Section 1981 provides, in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
§ 1981(a). Carnell’s § 1981 claims were tacked on to the Title VI claims in Carnell’s Third
Amended Complaint, filed prior to the start of the second trial. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 5–6, Carnell Constr. Corp., cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 357 (Oct. 14, 2014) (No. 146).
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contract.117 Carnell’s suit also alleged breach of contract, which
spurred the Housing Authority to bring the same action through a
counterclaim.118
The trial-court litigation proved to be lengthy and controversial.
Chock full of recalcitrant attempts by the Housing Authority’s
attorney to discredit the sincerity of Carnell’s discrimination claims,
the proceedings, which spanned three separate trials, also included
allegations that Carnell aggrandized contextual details “of the case to
make out a race claim” and engaged in racial grandstanding in an
attempt “to garner broader interest in the case in neighboring
counties.”119 At the third and final trial before appeal, the jury found
for the Housing Authority on the Title VI claims but for Carnell on
the breach of contract claims and counterclaim.120 The third jury
117. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979) (“The package of
statutes of which Title [VI] is one part also contains a provision whose language and
history demonstrate that Congress itself understood Title VI . . . as creating a private
remedy.”); id. at 703 (“We have no doubt that Congress . . . understood Title VI as
authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited
discrimination.”); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168–69 (1976) (“It is now well
established that § [1981] . . . prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement
of private contracts.” (citation omitted)); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 42 U.S. 454,
459–60 (1975) (explaining that § 1981 “relates primarily to racial discrimination in the
making and enforcement of contracts,” and holding “that § 1981 affords a federal remedy
against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race”).
118. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 711. Carnell’s contract claims revolved around
“allegations that Carnell was directed to perform work for which it was never paid, and
that Carnell was improperly removed from the project and declared in default of its
contract obligations.” Id. The Housing Authority’s breach of contract counterclaim
“framed Carnell’s lawsuit as an example of ‘occasions when false claims of race
discrimination are made in order to cover up poor performance, [to] excuse poor
performance, or to gain an advantage in a contractual situation.’ ” Id.
119. Id. at 711–13. After an initial jury verdict awarding Carnell $3.1 million in race
discrimination damages was vacated by a post-trial bench order that found portions of
testimony admitted on Carnell’s behalf to be false, the second trial also proved fruitless
after the jury deadlocked on both the race discrimination and contract claims causing the
judge to declare a mistrial. Id. at 711–12. The third trial was the charm, with the jury
reaching a mixed verdict—siding with the Housing Authority on the race claims and with
Carnell on both the breach of contract claims and counterclaim—and awarding Carnell a
nearly $1 million payday that was reduced to $215,000 by a post-trial bench order. Id. at
712–13.
120. Carnell’s § 1981 claims did not reach the jury, as the district court, quoting the
Supreme Court’s language in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 731
(1989), held that “Section 1981, while providing extensive rights, does not provide a
remedy against state actors.” Carnell Constr. Corp. v. Danville Redevelopment & Hous.
Auth., No. 4:10CV00007, 2012 WL 178341, at *8 (W.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2012), aff’d in part,
745 F.3d 703 (4th Cir. 2014). Thus, the court “conclude[d] that that [the Housing
Authority was] not amenable to suit under § 1981” and granted its motion for summary
judgment. Id. On appeal, Carnell did not object to the district court’s summary judgment
on its § 1981 claims. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 116, at 8–9.
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awarded Carnell breach-of-contract damages nearing $1 million, yet
the amount was cut by nearly three-quarters in a post-trial ruling by
the judge.121 Both Carnell and the defendants appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.122
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit primarily addressed whether
Carnell, as a minority-owned corporate entity,123 met the standing
requirements necessary to bring racial discrimination claims under
Title VI.124 The standing inquiry requires federal courts to consider
whether the litigants in any given action are entitled to bring suit in
federal court.125 Moreover, the standing doctrine is often
characterized as having both constitutional and prudential
dimensions.126 The Housing Authority conceded that Carnell met
121. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 711–12.
122. Id. at 712–13.
123. Id. at 715 (“It is undisputed that Carnell properly was certified by the
Commonwealth of Virginia as a [SWaM business] because its president and sole
shareholder is African-American. Carnell publicly represented that it was eligible for
consideration as a minority business enterprise when it contracted to work for the Housing
Authority on a public project receiving federal funding assistance.”).
124. Id. at 710. Carnell’s § 1981 claims, see supra note 116 and accompanying text,
though perfunctorily mentioned by the court in its disposition of separate issues raised by
Carnell (including objections to the district court’s evidentiary proceedings and agency
liability that required the court to engage in lengthy discussions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and Virginia contract law), were not included in the standing doctrine question
presented to the court, and thus were not directly addressed by its discussion of the matter.
Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 710, 714–16. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
the federal appellate court decisions cited by the Fourth Circuit in its consideration of
Carnell’s Title VI standing included a number of cases, decided in other jurisdictions, that
addressed § 1981 standing and reached similar conclusions as the court. See cases cited
supra note 6.
125. See MICHAEL L. WELLS, WILLIAM P. MARSHALL & GENE R. NICHOL, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 281 (3d. ed. 2015) (“The doctrine of ‘standing’
originally identified who may sue in an Article III court and continues to address that
question today. . . . [It] is the product of a profound struggle between competing
conceptions of what federal courts are and what they do and ought to do in American
public life. . . . Standing doctrine is therefore unruly, even incoherent, and by some
accounts manipulable in the service of substantive goals.”).
126. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 713 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984)). The Supreme Court has explained that the “irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing” requires a plaintiff in federal court to establish three requirements: “(1)
[plaintiff] has suffered an actual or threatened injury that is concrete, particularized, and
not conjectural; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. In addition to the Article III
requirements, however, federal courts also impose “prudential” limitations on standing to
ensure sufficient “concrete adverseness.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687
(2013) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). The Court in Windsor noted that
prudential considerations inform the standing inquiry in cases involving third-party
litigants, generalized grievances, and statutory zones of interest. See id. at 2686–87. See
generally, Micah J. Revell, Comment, Prudential Standing, the Zone of Interests, and the
New Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 63 EMORY L.J. 221 (2013) (contemplating whether the
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constitutional standing requirements and thus only “assert[ed] that
Carnell’s Title VI claims r[a]n afoul of one of the standing doctrine’s
judicially imposed, prudential limits on federal jurisdiction, which
requires that ‘a plaintiff’s grievance must arguably fall within the zone
of interests protected or regulated by the statutory
provision . . . invoked in the suit.’ ”127 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit’s
“relevant standing inquiry” concerned whether Carnell’s claims fell
within the “zone of interests” Congress sought to protect in enacting
Title VI.128
The court ruled in favor of Carnell on the question of Title VI
standing.129 The majority opinion rejected the Housing Authority’s
call to vitiate the Title VI claims on grounds that Carnell, as a
corporate entity, lacked a “race, color, or national origin” and thus
fell outside the statute’s protective scope.130 Instead, the court sided
with Carnell, broadly construing Title VI’s protection to radiate
beyond the “natural person” confines.131
Though the question of corporate standing under Title VI was
one of first impression for the Fourth Circuit, neither the issue nor the
court’s holding are novel. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit panel was the
eighth circuit court to hold that prudential considerations132 do not
destroy standing for corporations asserting race discrimination
claims.133 In reaching its decision, the court “observe[d] that several

zone of interests test is a constitutional, statutory, or prudential limit under the current law
of jurisdiction).
127. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 713 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162
(1997)).
128. Id. As Justice Douglas wrote in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), “The question of standing . . . concerns,
apart from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test, the question whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Id. at 153. The Supreme
Court’s decisions expressly involving the zone of interest standing requirement have
applied the zone test “generously.” See WELLS ET AL., supra note 125, at 357 (discussing
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) (explaining the zone of interest test as
creating a “presumption” in favor of standing and characterizing the standard as not
“especially demanding”)).
129. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 709–10.
130. Id. at 713–16.
131. Id.
132. For a discussion of prudential considerations, see generally Revell, supra note 126,
at 221.
133. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Further explanation of two cases is
warranted. In Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water District, 601 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1979), the First
Circuit granted third-party standing to a corporate litigant alleging race discrimination.
The court concluded the corporation had “an implied right of action against any other
person who, with a racially discriminatory intent, interferes with his right to make
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other federal appellate courts have considered this question, and have
declined to bar on prudential grounds race discrimination claims
brought by minority-owned corporations that meet constitutional
standing requirements.”134 Indeed, the majority opinion repeatedly
cited the substantial number of sister circuits in support of their
affirmative answer to the question of corporate standing on federal
race claims.135 In particular, the court cited with approbation the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thinket Ink Information Resources, Inc. v.
Sun Microsystems, Inc.,136 concerning § 1981 racial discrimination
claims.137 Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that the
corporate plaintiff had standing under § 1981, it had little choice but
to concede the defendant’s assertion that
[t]he issue of whether corporations could assert § 1981 claims
was cast into doubt by dictum in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,138 in which Justice
Powell observed that “as a corporation, [the plaintiff] has no
racial identity and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners’
alleged discrimination.”139
The Carnell court buttressed the Ninth Circuit’s repudiation of
the Arlington Heights dictum by pointing to a decades-old
observation by the Second Circuit in Hudson Valley Freedom Theater,
Inc. v. Heimbach,140 a Title VI case where the court expressed
disbelief “that the Supreme Court would deny standing to [a]
corporation because it ‘has no racial identity and cannot be the direct
target’ of the discrimination, while at the same time it would be
obliged to deny standing to the stockholders on the sound ground that
the injury was suffered by the corporation and not by them.”141
Convinced by the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Hudson Valley
that “when a corporation satisfies constitutional requirements for
standing, prudential considerations should not prohibit that

contracts with non-whites.” Id. at 13–14. The Second Circuit, in Hudson Valley Freedom
Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach, 671 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1982), employed similar logic in its
decision to allow a corporate entity to assert racial discrimination claims in a controversy
over disbursement of grant funds. Id.
134. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 714 (alteration in original).
135. Id.
136. 368 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2004).
137. Id. at 1058–59.
138. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
139. Thinket Ink Info. Res., 368 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at
263) (alteration in original)).
140. 671 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1982).
141. Id. at 706 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 263) (alteration in original).
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corporation from alleging that a defendant, on racial grounds, has
acted to obstruct purposes that the corporation was created to
accomplish,” the Fourth Circuit panel construed the Arlington
Heights dictum as inapposite.142 The majority, employing language
and logic foreshadowing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hobby
Lobby, distinguished Carnell by noting that
[i]n Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court was not required to
consider whether a corporation had standing to assert that it
suffered injury based on racial discrimination in violation of
federal law, because one of the other plaintiffs in the case was
an African-American individual who plainly had demonstrated
standing to bring the action.143 Thus, the quoted language from
Arlington Heights was surplusage unrelated to the Court’s
determination of the standing issue presented.144
After clearing the Arlington Heights hurdle, the Second Circuit
in Hudson Valley appeared to prescribe guidelines to limit future
assertions of corporate standing under Title VI.145 In reasoning that
“[p]rudential considerations should not prohibit [a corporation from]
asserting that [another party], on racial grounds, [is] frustrating
specific acts of the sort which the corporation was founded to
accomplish,” the Hudson Valley panel fashioned a compass to guide
future courts through the legal twilight it had traversed: a nexus must
exist between a corporation’s purpose and the race-based claims of
discrimination it seeks to pursue.146 Recalling that “prudential
limitations on standing [were imposed] to obtain ‘the assurance that
the most effective advocate of the rights at issue [would be] present to
champion them,’ ” the court concluded that “[i]t would indeed be
paradoxical if prudential standing considerations were to limit the
range of permissible plaintiffs . . . to those who would be required to
file complaints indulging in the sort of speculation which the Court
has found suspect under its constitutional standing analysis.”147
The Fourth Circuit, however, opted to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
more expansive “imputed racial identity” standard, which dispenses
with the purpose-race nexus in favor of a minority-race certification
process operationalized by a varied host of affirmative action
142. Carnell Constr. Corp. v. Danville Redev. & Hous. Auth., 745 F.3d 703, 714–15
(4th Cir. 2014).
143. Id. at 715 (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 263).
144. Id.
145. See Hudson Valley Freedom Theater, Inc., 671 F.2d at 706–07.
146. Id. at 705–06 (alteration in original).
147. Id. at 706–07 (alteration in original).
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programs that span all levels of government and requirement
standards.148 Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling enables corporate
entities to litigate federal suits alleging racial discrimination wholly
apart from their minority-race owners, assuming the asserted minority
status (“racial identity”) has been properly certified (“imputed”)
under applicable law.149
The court therefore found that the Virginia government properly
certified Carnell as a “Small, Women- and Minority-Owned
Business” and that Carnell publicly represented this certified
eligibility when it contracted to work for the Housing Authority.150
Moreover, the court concluded that Carnell’s claims against the
Housing Authority referred to actions that occurred during Carnell’s
performance of its contract, that Carnell sufficiently alleged
discrimination on the basis of its owner’s minority status, and that
Carnell “suffered direct injury as a result of that racial
discrimination.”151 The court thus held that “Carnell sufficiently has
shown an imputed racial identity permitting us to conclude that
Carnell’s corporate status does not prevent its race discrimination
claims from falling within the zone of interests protected by Title
VI.”152
The Fourth Circuit, having adopted the Thinket court’s “imputed
racial identity” standard, “conclude[d] that the district court correctly
held that Carnell had standing to assert race discrimination claims
against the Housing Authority,” yet held that the district judge’s
decision to allow the Housing Authority to impeach Carnell’s
president was reversible error.153 Thus, the court vacated the district
court’s judgment with respect to the race discrimination claims and
remanded the case for a new trial, extending the parties’ litigation
saga.154 Soon after, the Housing Authority sought clarification on the
issue of corporate standing under Title VI by petitioning the Supreme
Court for writ of certiorari.155 Carnell responded by filing a
conditional cross-petition that raised questions involving the Fourth

148. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 715.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 715–16 (alteration in original).
153. Id. at 726.
154. Id.
155. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 116, at 20–21; see also Brian Mahoney,
High Court Asked To Decide if Companies Can Sue for Race Bias, LAW360 (July 3, 2014,
6:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/554554/high-court-asked-to-decide-if-cos-can-suefor-race-bias [http://perma.cc/ENH2-YE85].
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Circuit’s decision on the breach-of-contract claims.156 The Court
denied both petitions in October 2014.157
In addition to reaching its decision on the theory of imputed
racial identity, the Fourth Circuit also suggested that the “plain
language may allow a corporation to have Title VI standing [because
although] Title VI does not specifically define ‘person,’ [] the
Dictionary Act does: ‘In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise,’ the word person
‘include[s] corporations.’ ”158 Seemingly unable to identify the
contextual considerations that must exist to warrant an alternative
construction of the term, the Fourth Circuit suggested that the
Dictionary Act’s definition is authoritative.159 Further, the Fourth
Circuit pointed out that “[Title VI] prohibits a ‘person’ from being
discriminated against ‘on the ground of race, color, or national origin,’
not ‘on the ground of his or her race, color, or national origin.’ ”160
The Fourth Circuit’s clever remark on statutory construction further
illustrates the idea of corporate personhood and the increasingly
widespread trend in both federal and state courts to more thoroughly
naturalize the corporate person.
III. REORIENTING PERSONHOOD ANALYSIS IN THE JUDICIARY
As detailed above, the decisions in Hobby Lobby and Carnell
Construction stand for the proposition that certain characteristics—
Mr. Scales’s African-American racial identity in Carnell Construction
and the Green family’s Christian beliefs in Hobby Lobby—impute
from corporate owner to corporate entity. Moreover, the logic
underlying each decision illustrates that, where federal law protects a
156. Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Carnell Constr. Corp., cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 361 (2014) (No. 14-117).
157. Khadijah M. Britton, High Court Lets Stand Companies’ Right To Sue for Race Bias,
LAW360 (Oct. 14, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/586741/high-court-letsstand-companies-right-to-sue-for-race-bias [http://perma.cc/8L3G-ANNA] (“In its petition,
the housing authority had asked the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify whether companies can
have a racial identity and sue for racial discrimination.”).
158. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 714 n.4 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
159. The Supreme Court’s endorsement of the Dictionary Act’s personhood definition
in Hobby Lobby, see supra Section II.A., suggests a ringing endorsement of the Fourth
Circuit’s approach.
160. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 714 n.4 (emphasis added) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d). The court notes that a similar argument was made in a “corporate race” case
decided by the Second Circuit, Hudson Valley Freedom Theater v. Heimbach, 671 F.2d
702, 705 (2d Cir. 1982), and finds supportive the Supreme Court’s observation in
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707–08 (2012), that Congress often
uses the word “individual” to mean something different from its use of the word “person.”
Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 714 n.4.
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traditionally personal characteristic and that characteristic is asserted
on behalf of a corporation, the artificiality of the corporate entity
does not preclude courts from endowing it with inalienable or civil
rights, absent explicit legislation to the contrary. Neither the Hobby
Lobby nor Carnell Construction courts seemed overly concerned with
the long-term, cumulative consequences of transferring right-based
guarantees of judicial recourse from the corporate owner to the
corporation; rather, both accepted, at least implicitly, the corporatepersonhood framework advanced by the corporations themselves.
Indeed, as Professor Stefan J. Padfield has noted, “Justice Alito’s
majority opinion [in Hobby Lobby] equated the closely held
corporation with its controlling shareholders, and thus granted the
corporation standing to claim interference with its free exercise rights,
[while] Justice Ginsburg argued in the dissent that the corporation
could not, as an artificial entity, exercise religion.”161 Judge Keenan’s
majority opinion in Carnell Construction similarly equated the
contractor corporation with its president and sole shareholder and
thus granted the minority-owned business standing to claim
discrimination based on race.162 Thus, in both cases, the respective
court appeared to drink the corporation-as-an-association-ofindividuals Kool-Aid endorsed by the corporate parties.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court took
different paths to arrive at the same destination. The Supreme Court
took a contextual approach; in defining RFRA personhood to include
closely held, for-profit companies, the Court primarily rested its
decision on the Dictionary Act’s expansive definition of the word
“person.”163 The Fourth Circuit banished the Dictionary Act’s support
to a footnote, relying instead on a common law theory of imputed
identity. In addition, the majorities in both cases took pains to cabin
their decisions to certain subcategories within larger groups in
attempts, one must surmise, to preclude their reasoning from gaining
widespread applicability: i.e., the Fourth Circuit only sanctioned the
imputation of racial identity to corporations that (1) allege
discrimination under Title VI, and (2) are shown to be “properly
certified as [minority-owned] under applicable law.”164 Likewise, the
161. Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 22 n.91 (2015) (citing Stefan J. Padfield, The Role of Corporate
Personality Theory in Hobby Lobby, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF.
BLOG (July 6, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/07/the-role-ofcorporate-personality-theory-in-hobby-lobby.html [http://perma.cc/TVN4-FZM8].
162. See Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 714–15.
163. See supra Section II.A.
164. Id.
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Supreme Court only green-lighted the extension of religious exercise
rights to for-profit corporations that (1) bring suit under RFRA, and
(2) are deemed “closely held.”165
Rulemaking reticence and theoretical divergence permeate the
corporate personhood case law166 and illustrate the need for robust
and uniform corporate rights standards. Such an undertaking will not
be easy, especially given that the Supreme Court currently “has no
systematic jurisprudence for corporate [personhood],” with the
limited understanding it does possess being “the product of a dialectic
between judges, who patched together corporate law from the corpus
of eighteenth century common law, and scholars, who wanted to
invigorate that doctrine with a simulacrum of internal coherence.”167
Professor Malcom J. Harkins has argued that the development of a
comprehensive and forward-looking framework that teases out the
differences between corporate and natural personhood is necessary to
return clarity and certainty to the law:
Rather than creating uncertainty and risk, the law should
promote citizens’ ability to choose the benefits and burdens of
proposed conduct. . . . It is long past time for the Supreme Court
to establish a corporate person theory and concomitant
decisional principles that should produce, if not consistent, at
least understandable and rational outcomes when questions
regarding the corporation’s entitlement to constitutional
protection are raised.168
As Harkins suggests, the Supreme Court’s outdated and disjointed
approach169 to weighing corporate claims of personhood is simply

165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 10, at 650 (condemning the Court’s “pragmatic, antitheoretical approach to corporate rights”); Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional
Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1348 (1979) (noting a lack of
consistency in constitutional jurisprudence on the nature of the corporation and its rights);
Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A
Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1425, 1465 (1992) (concluding that corporate rights cases generate “only legal
conclusions,” after failing to find any coherent theories in corporate law jurisprudence that
unify or explain the extension of corporate rights).
167. Miller, supra note 11, at 914.
168. Harkins, supra note 15, at 310 (citing Cty. of San Bernardino v. S. Pac. R.R. Co.,
118 U.S. 417, 423 (1886) (Field, J. concurring)).
169. See Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in
Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 399 (2006) (discussing the “right-byright basis” of corporate personhood decision making); Krannich, supra note 101, at 62
(describing the “ad hoc, arbitrary” extension of corporate constitutional rights and
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unsustainable.170 The ad hoc creation of corporate rights, wherein
determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, offers a temporary
solution that fails to address broader systemic concerns.
The Supreme Court’s reliance on quick fixes has already proved
problematic. For example, because questions of corporate
personhood frequently intersect with questions of constitutional law,
a seemingly benign Supreme Court decision concerning a question of
statutory corporate rights, such as Hobby Lobby, could unknowingly
jeopardize constitutional decisions that appear unrelated facially.171
For example,
Roe v. Wade’s holding establishing a constitutional right to
abortion rested, in part, on the Supreme Court’s largely
unexplained assertion “that the word ‘person’ as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.” A
Supreme Court decision identifying the attributes that allow an
entity, artificial or natural, to claim the status of a legal person
may confirm, or provide a basis to reexamine, Roe’s assertion
about the meaning of the term “person” as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment.172
In other words, although Hobby Lobby and Carnell Construction
were decided on statutory grounds, the logic and textual
interpretation underlying both decisions—and the countless other
corporate rights cases that have come before and are sure to follow—
could reopen constitutional doors that appear, at first blush, wholly
unrelated.173 In addition, the cumulative impact of a continued
expansion of corporate constitutional rights could prove equally
dangerous.

pointing out that “different corporate metaphors have been used within the same case,
even in interpreting different portions of the same Constitutional Amendment”).
170. See Harkins, supra note 15, at 205.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 310.
173. Id. As Harkins further elaborates:
[I]t ought to be remembered that the corporate personhood debate in San Mateo
and Santa Clara asked [whether] the protection afforded “persons” by the
Fourteenth Amendment include corporations. As the RFRA claims alleged in
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood illustrate, the Fourteenth Amendment is
merely one among many constitutional and statutory provisions affording
protection to legal persons. Consequently, [the Supreme Court’s] resolution of
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood may have impact far beyond the ACA claims
at issue in those cases.
Id. (alteration in original).
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Professor John D. Inazu’s recent attempt to stitch together the
First Amendment rights of speech, press, religion, and assembly (or,
what Inazu labels the “Four Freedoms”) into a single patchwork of
protection from government interference powerfully illustrates the
potential impact of corporate personhood jurisprudence, including
Citizens United, Hobby Lobby, and Carnell Construction.174 Inazu
supports his accretive and interconnected understanding of the First
Amendment, which he calls “strong pluralism,” by investigating
“connections among [the] rights evident at the Framing . . . [and]
prominent during the 1930s and 1940s, when legal and political
rhetoric recognized the ‘preferred position’ of the ‘Four
Freedoms.’ ”175 At its core, Inazu contends, strong pluralism stands
for the proposition that “government action should not be permitted
to burden civic groups in their exercise of the four freedoms and, in
particular, it should not interfere with membership and leadership
decisions.”176
Applying strong pluralism to corporate First Amendment rights
could prove dangerous. Others have pushed back against such a
theory177 by challenging the unqualified outcomes that adherence to
Inazu’s theory would require, including the contention that
“associations should have a constitutional right to limit membership
on any ground, including race.”178 Professor Nelson Tebbe’s criticism
of strong pluralism, including his suggestion that the increased liberty
boon provided by strong pluralism may simply not warrant the
disposal of an “existing settlement between associational interests and
equality values,”179 presciently highlights the uncertainty and equality
concerns that could become a reality if the current trend toward
corporate conferral of constitutional freedoms and statutory rights is
sustained.180

174. John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 782, 790–92 (2014).
175. Id. at 787–89.
176. Nelson Tebbe, Response, Associations and the Constitution: Four Questions About
Four Freedoms, 92 N.C. L. REV. 917, 918 (2014); see also Inazu, supra note 174, at 794.
177. See, e.g., Tebbe, supra note 174, at 918.
178. Id. at 917.
179. Id. Professor Tebbe also attacks the pragmatism and conceptual soundness of
Inazu’s strong pluralism and raises constitutional concerns over its attempt to preserve
“the ability of individuals to form associations that could limit membership in unlimited
ways,” while simultaneously “protect[ing] their ability to do so while retaining all
government benefits that they would otherwise receive under general programs.” Id. at
942.
180. See id. at 927–28.
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As Hobby Lobby and Carnell Construction make clear,
corporations are unlikely to run out of creative legal arguments upon
which to ground their claims of corporate rights, and it is difficult to
predict how lower courts will decide claims that assert corporate
entitlement to new statutory or constitutional protections. “Corporate
personality” theories, long ago developed by corporate law scholars
to enable more robust academic discussions of corporate personhood,
offer one path forward.181 The use of such theories has transcended
the corporate personhood debate by recasting the discussion in more
nuanced terms.182 As one corporate law authority has explained,
“distinguishing corporate personality theory from corporate
personhood [is necessary] because a thumbs up on corporate
personhood . . . still leaves a number of important questions regarding
the nature of this ‘person,’ which . . . theories of corporate
personality . . . are well-positioned to answer.”183
Corporate personality scholars have identified three primary
corporate personality theories: (1) artificial entity or concession
theory, (2) real-entity theory, and (3) aggregate theory.184 Courts and
scholars utilize these three theories, often implicitly, to better
conceptualize the rights and responsibilities of the corporate person
at issue.185 Such “[t]heories of corporate personality seek to define the
nature of corporations so as to provide a framework within which to
determine the rights and responsibilities of corporations vis-à-vis the
rest of society.”186
Real entity theory views “the firm [as] a distinct, autonomous
being that is separate from, and more than just the sum of, its
individual (human) parts.”187 This life-like conception of corporate
entities differs markedly from aggregate theory, “which assumes that

181. Professors John Dewey and Arthur Machen authored the seminal accounts. See
John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655,
656 (1926). See generally Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality (pts. 1 & 2), 24
HARV. L. REV. 253, 253–67, 347–65 (1911) (explaining his iconic conception of corporate
personhood theory).
182. See, e.g., Padfield, supra note 161, at 19–20.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id., at 19.
187. Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to
Function, 118 PA. ST. L. REV. 1, 7 (2013). Machen described real entity theory as standing
for the proposition that “[a] corporation is an entity—not imaginary or fictitious, but real,
not artificial but natural. Its existence is as real as that of an army or of the Church.”
Machen, supra note 181, at 262.
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the firm is not more than a sum of its individual parts.”188
Nevertheless, both “aggregate theory and real entity theory
essentially presume corporations stand in the shoes of natural persons
(shareholders in the former case, and the board of directors in the
latter), and thus have available to them all the rights of natural
persons in resisting government regulation.”189 Artificial entity or
concession theory, on the other hand, segregates corporate persons
from their natural brethren, at least in the eyes of the law, by noting
that the former, unlike the latter, depends on the state for creation.190
A concession theorist, in other words, “views the corporation as
fundamentally a state creation, and presumes the state has the right to
regulate its creation as it sees fit.”191
While, like any theoretical framework, corporate personality
theory is incomplete, its adoption—and, more importantly, its
consistent application—by the Supreme Court would provide federal
courts and corporate attorneys across the country with the conceptual
power and organizational wherewithal necessary to bring greater
coherence to the chaotic body of corporate-rights law and greater
structure to corporate personhood’s patchwork legal existence.
Unfortunately, the Court’s recent corporate personhood decisions
eschew both logic and consistency.192 The Court has instead
demonstrated a proclivity for issuing fact-intensive rulings that
narrowly frame the analytical discussion around protecting the
jeopardized right rather than the corporate nature of the party
seeking its protection. Such decisions provide little more than stopgap measures, which collectively telegraph an untenable lack of
doctrinal rigor.
Indeed, the Court has largely shunned the corporate personality
framework altogether, with Justice Stevens explicitly noting in one
188. Petrin, supra note 187, at 7 n.22 (citing Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real
Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1066–68 (1994)).
189. Padfield, supra note 161, at 20.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Petrin, supra note 187, at 14 (“Unlike in the civil law jurisdictions, in
which discussion surrounding the nature of legal entities has mostly come to an end, here
the debate indeed seems ‘endless’ and, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recently noted, ‘continues to evolve in complex and unexpected ways.’ ” (footnotes
omitted)); cf. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1141 (2012) (“[S]harp
disagreement continues today over what legal rights should go along with modern
understandings of corporate personhood. Importantly, pointed disagreement also
continues today over what responsibilities should go along with twenty-first-century
understandings of corporate personhood.” (footnote omitted)).
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instance that personality theory played no part in the Court’s
decision.193 Such intentional disavowals are ill-advised; they inject
further confusion into the law by leaving the reader to guess at
whether the Court’s decision rests on an undisclosed novel alternative
theory, or whether there is simply no logic at all. Moreover, such
wholesale doctrinal rejections often contradict the Court’s underlying
reasoning—indeed, some scholars have argued recent corporate
personhood decisions contain implicit references to corporate
personality theories.194
As Miller recently explained,
One must consider the consequences of the Court’s attempt to
dodge corporate personhood, by focusing, Citizens United-style,
on the scope of the right, rather than on the party asserting
it. . . . [A]ttempting to sidestep the corporate form by focusing
on the right simply assumes the equivalence of the corporate
person and the natural person. Therefore, any restriction on the
right for natural persons has to be identical to those of
corporations. If the Court fashions a doctrine based on the
“scope” of the [underlying right at issue] by reference to the
“scope” of the right for corporations, it is simply employing a
type of artificial entity determination in disguise.195
These evasive maneuvers fly in the face of the teachings of corporate
personality theorists, who have long-since warned that “[t]he essence
of juristic personality does not lie in the possession of rights but in
subjection to liabilities. Those beings are ‘persons’ in law to whom the
law both can and does address its commands.”196
193. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 465 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (“Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is
conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, . . . a nexus of explicit and implicit
contracts, . . . a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, . . . or any other recognized model.”).
Stephen Bainbridge has, however, suggested Justice Stevens’s opinion belies his
reservations about corporate personality. See Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC:
Stevens’ Pernicious Version of the Concession Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan.
21, 2010, 4:05 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01
/citizens-united-v-fecstevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html [http://perma
.cc/D8BR-8KC2].
194. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 11, at 943 (discussing corporate personality theory in
the context of the Second Amendment). Padfield, supra note 161, at 30 nn.120–21; Stefan
J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance
Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 833 (2013) (“Despite protestations to the contrary . . . a
closer reading of the Citizens United opinion reveals that both the majority and dissent not
only adopted diverging theories of the corporation, but that those theories were likely
dispositive.”).
195. Miller, supra note 11, at 943–44.
196. Machen, supra note 181, at 263.
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Moreover, as noted by one of America’s earliest corporate
personality scholars, “[w]e do not need to be instructed to regard a
corporation as an entity and to regard that entity as a person[, as] our
minds are so constituted that we cannot help taking that view.”197 Yet,
as is often the case in assimilating commonsense principles and
natural conceptions into legal analysis, corporate personhood
doctrine “will tend to find its proper place in the law, if only we cease
to regard it as something mysterious or technical.”198 Courts must, in
other words, “fully recognize that the [personhood] conception is
simple and natural,” and then “endeavor to apply it . . . logically and
consistently.”199
As this Comment has shown, there is little doubt among jurists
that the Court’s imprimatur of corporate personhood in both
statutory law, evidenced most recently by Hobby Lobby’s extension
of RFRA religious-freedom protections,200 and constitutional law,201
including the Supreme Court’s extension of First Amendment freespeech protections in Citizens United,202 has only further muddled
corporate rights jurisprudence. The Court’s position has also arguably
emboldened covetous corporate litigants to reach for more.203 And,
given the myriad statutory protections and constitutional rights that
remain, for now, outside the corporate rights wheelhouse, it seems
unlikely that corporations will halt their forward advance anytime
soon. There is simply too little to lose and too much to gain.204 Indeed,
197. Id. at 363.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 364.
200. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).
201. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 10, at 578 (surveying corporate claims to specific
constitutional rights and characterizing the Supreme Court’s conferral of significant Bill of
Rights protections on corporations as symbolic of “the transformation of our
constitutional system from one of individual freedoms to one of organizational
prerogatives”); see also sources cited supra note 10.
202. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010).
203. Marc Galanter has argued that the state’s tendency to “farm[] out” governmental
functions such as “prison[], police, and even military operations,” to the private sector has
compounded a corporate campaign to “penetrate[] and patronize[]” educational, athletic,
and medical institutions that has led to a “naturaliz[ation]” of corporate identity. Galanter,
supra note 10, at 1399–1400 (“The[] presence [of business corporations] has been
naturalized—they are not seen as inhabitants of the specialized realm of production, but as
institutions of civic life. They have discarded their old names based on their work (e.g.,
AT&T, Standard Oil) to become Verizon or Exxon, sonorous invocations of institutional
dynamism.”) (alteration in original).
204. Marc Galanter has suggested that “[a]t the moment it appears that [corporations]
are well on their way to capturing the legal profession and overwhelming or circumventing
the courts. Whether the[y] can be tamed by the courts depends on the emergence of a
democratic politics that is informed by the public’s basic insight into dominance of
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further erosion of the already porous barrier between natural and
corporate personhood seems all but certain when one considers the
mutual reinforcement of the Supreme Court’s increasing coziness
with equating corporate operations to human conduct and the lower
courts’ kindred willingness to graft human characteristics onto
corporate skeletons.
CONCLUSION
Are corporations people? This question defies an easy answer.
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court suggest that the nation’s high
Court thinks the answer is “Yes.” Likewise, recent federal court
rulings expanding corporate rights, including, most recently, a
decision by the Fourth Circuit, suggest a judicial consensus that
corporations are much the same as human beings. Therefore, at least
for now, it seems the federal judiciary has tightly embraced the theory
of corporate personhood. And, given the increasingly pervasive and
important roles corporations play in modern society, the courts’ take
cannot be said to lack either merit or reason. Indeed, as Dean Ritz
has observed, “[c]orporations today act in the capacity of
governments. Energy corporations determine our nation’s energy
policies. Automobile corporations determine our nation’s
transportation policies. Military manufacturing corporations
determine our nation’s defense policies. Corporate polluters and
resource extraction corporations define our environmental policies.
Transnational corporations determine our trading policies.”205
Despite the arguments in favor of corporate personhood theory,
a lack of theoretical structure has plagued the concept of corporate
rights since the start. And the absence is palpable. Strikingly, the
Supreme Court, despite hearing numerous corporate rights cases
begging for greater uniformity, has chosen to disregard this doctrinal
void. While the Court continues to hear cases touching on the theory
of corporate personhood, it has not managed to offer even the
roughest of outlines setting out a theoretical framework for the scope
and strength of corporate personhood. Rather, lower courts have
been left to grope blindly in the dark in distinguishing natural from
corporate personhood and determining whether and when a
[corporate actors] and the distributive tilt of the legal system. It will also depend on the
inventiveness of lawyers in coming up with new formats and devices for making public
policy and effectively controlling [corporations].” Id. at 1417 (alteration in original).
205. DEAN RITZ, DEFYING CORPORATIONS, DEFINING DEMOCRACY xiv (Dean Ritz
ed., 2001) (arguing that corporations “increasingly define our culture, our schools, our
elections, and the operations of our government itself”).
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corporation can assume the rights of its owners or shareholders.
Instead, the Supreme Court has sown corporate rights into the law in
a distinctively ad-hoc pattern. Lower courts, left with little choice but
to follow suit, have contributed in varied, arbitrary patterns of their
own.
As this Comment has endeavored to show, the Supreme Court’s
case-by-case legal conclusions serve as poor substitutes for developing
a robust theoretical framework that differentiates rights on the basis
of corporate and natural personhood. Corporate personality theory
arguably offers the best solution. Otherwise, the Court’s corporate
personhood house of cards will collapse.
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